






Tilting the Supply Schedule to 
Enhance Competition in  
Uniform-Price Auctions 
Marco LiCalzi and Alessandro Pavan 














Marco LiCalzi, Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Venice 










This paper can be downloaded without charge at: 
 
The Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Note di Lavoro Series Index: 
http://www.feem.it/web/activ/_wp.html 
  







The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei  
 






Uniform-price auctions of a divisible good in fixed supply admit underpricing 
equilibria, where bidders submit high inframarginal bids to prevent competition on 
prices. The seller can obstruct this behavior by tilting her supply schedule and making 
the amount of divisible good on offer change endogenously with its (uniform) price. 
Precommitting to an increasing supply curve is a strategic instrument to reward 
aggressive bidding and enhance expected revenue. A fixed supply may not be optimal 
even when accounting for the cost to the seller of issuing a quantity different from her 
target supply. 
 
Keywords: Uniform-price auction, divisible good, strategic role of the seller, 
endogenous supply, Treasury and IPO auctions 
 
JEL: D44, E58 
 
This paper has been presented at the EuroConference on “Auctions and Market 
Design: Theory, Evidence and Applications” organised by Fondazione Eni Enrico 
Mattei and sponsored by the EU, Milan, September 26-28, 2002.  
The authors are greatly indebted to Mario Gilli, who participated in the early stages of 
this project. The authors are grateful for their helpful comments to the editor, two 
referees, and participants at the 11th Italian Conference in Game Theory and 
Applications, at the 52nd European Meeting of the Econometric Society and at the 9th 
Summer School in Economic Theory on Auctions and Market Design. We benefited from 
discussions with Bruno Biais, Bengt Holmstrom, Paul Milgrom, Jean Charles Rochet, 




Address for correspondence:  
 
Alessandro Pavan  
Department of Economics 
Northwestern University 
Andersen Hall, Room 3239 
2003 Sheridan Road 
Evanston, IL 60208-2600 
U.S.A. 
Phone: [++1] (847) 491-8266 
Fax: [++1] (847) 491-7001 
E-mail: alepavan@northwestern.edu 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the last few years, uniform-price auctions have become a popular mechanism to allocate
divisible goods. For instance, since September 1998, the U.S. Department of Treasury has
switched from a traditional discriminatory format to the uniform-price auction to issue all its
securities1. Similarly, uniform-price auctions are now commonly used to run on-line initial
public oﬀerings of unseasoned shares (Open IPOs), as well as in electricity markets and in
markets for emission permits.
In a uniform-price auction, bidders compete by simultaneously submitting their demand
schedules for the divisible good on oﬀer. The seller compares the aggregate demand with her
aggregate supply and computes a clearing (stop-out) price. Demand above the stop-out price
is awarded in full, while marginal demand at the stop-out price is prorated. Since all buyers
pay the same price, the uniform-price auction is analogous to a Walrasian market, with the
only diﬀerence that demand schedules are submitted strategically; see Nyborg (2002).
This diﬀerence makes uniform-price auctions susceptible to substantial underpricing, be-
cause bidders can submit high inframarginal demands that prevent competition on prices
and support equilibria where the stop-out price is lower than its Walrasian equivalent. The
possibility of underpricing equilibria was ﬁrst proven in Wilson (1979), Maxwell (1983) and
Back and Zender (1993). This result has been shown robust to diﬀerent model speciﬁca-
tions by Ausubel and Crampton (1998), Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet (2001), Engelbrecht
and Kahn (1998), Noussair (1994), and Wang and Zender (2002).
A common assumption across these papers is that the supply of the auctioned good is ﬁxed
in advance. This seemingly innocuous assumption implies a strategic asymmetry between the
bidders and the seller: the former can use their demand schedules to inhibit price competition,
but the latter cannot alter her supply schedule to enhance it. It is plausible to expect that
the introduction of an adjustable supply should prevent at least some underpricing equilibria.
Intuitively, while the steepness of the competitors’ demand curves has a price eﬀect which
increases the marginal cost of a higher bid, an increasing supply function induces a quantity
eﬀect that raises its marginal revenue. Making the quantity eﬀect greater than the price
eﬀect inhibits coordination on low prices.
Only a few papers have studied the equilibria of a uniform-price auction with a variable
1 The decision to extend the uniform price format to all Treasury securities was taken at the completion
of a period of nine years in which this format had been limited to two-years, ﬁve-years and inﬂation-adjusted
bonds.
1supply. Back and Zender (2001) shows that, if the seller reserves the right to decrease her
supply after receiving the bids, underpricing – while still possible – is severely curtailed.
McAdams (2001) derives a similar result and then shows that underpricing is eliminated if the
seller reserves the right to increase or arbitrarily adjust her supply. Lengwiler (1999) assumes
that the seller produces the good at a constant marginal cost which is private information to
her and studies how the right to restrict supply aﬀects the bidders’ demand schedules.
These papers share the assumption that the supply is adjustable after the seller has
observed the bid schedules. However, there are situations where it may be necessary to
precommit and declare the supply schedule before observing the bid schedules. For instance,
declaring the supply schedule ex ante increases transparency in IPOs of unseasoned shares
and thus should reduce the winner’s curse. In electricity markets2 near peak capacity, there
m a ys i m p l yb en ot i m et oa l l o wf o rex post adjustments.
This paper studies the existence of underpricing equilibria when the seller precommits
to an increasing supply schedule, as suggested in Pavan (1996). We ﬁnd that underpric-
ing is still possible, although to a lesser extent than in the case of an ex post decreasable
supply. Committing ex ante to an increasing supply attaches a positive quantity eﬀect to
price competition. This eﬀect more than compensates the ﬂexibility lost by giving up ex post
reductions. On the other hand, note that precommitment entails the risk of losing control
on the quantity sold. Therefore, we show also that a ﬁxed supply is in general suboptimal
even if the seller faces increasing costs for selling a quantity diverging from her supply target.
The expected gain from reducing underpricing may oﬀset the expected loss from selling a
quantity potentially diﬀerent from the target.
A variable supply is not the only means for the seller to obstruct underpricing in uniform-
price auctions. Kremer (1998) and Nyborg (2002) suggest adopting diﬀerent rationing rules.
McAdams (2001) proposes to oﬀer discounts to marginal bidders. Some ﬁne-grained insti-
tutional details also hamper underpricing: Nyborg (2002) considers allowing only a ﬁnite
number of bids, or imposing a tick size for price or quantities; Back and Zender (1993)
considers the uncertainty about supply induced by the presence of noncompetitive bidders.
Some of these factors may go towards explaining why, in spite of their theoretical ubiq-
uity, the degree in which underpricing equilibria occur is still controversial. The empirical
literature has concentrated mostly on the question whether more revenue is raised by a dis-
criminatory or by a uniform-price auction; see Binmore and Swierzbinski (2001) for a critical
2 In these markets, the auctioned good is the right to service the exogenous demand for electricity.
2review. However, the experimental evidence reported in Goswami et alii (1996) shows that
bidders manage to coordinate on underpricing, at least in environments where nonbinding
preplay communication is possible. Evidence of underpricing is reported by Tenorio (1997)
for foreign currency auctions in Zambia, by Kandel et alii (1999) for IPO auctions in Israel,
and by Bjonnes (2001) for Treasury auctions in Norway. Keloharju et alii (2001) conﬁrms
the underpricing in Treasury auctions in Finland, but argues that it is not due to strategic
manipulation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, which is a
straightforward variation on the setup in Back and Zender (1993). Section 3 characterizes
a large class of symmetric equilibria under ﬁxed supply, which contains as special cases all
the symmetric underpricing equilibria studied in the literature. Section 4 studies the eﬀects
of an increasing supply schedule and generalizes the equilibria of Section 3 to the case of
an increasing and concave supply schedule. Section 5 analyzes the symmetric underpricing
equilibria under a linear supply schedule. Section 6 studies the seller’s ex ante choice of a
linear supply schedule that maximizes her expected proﬁt and provides an example with an
explicit derivation. Finally, Section 7 rounds up the paper with a few comments. All proofs
are in the Appendix.
2 The model
A single (female) seller wishes to auction a homogenous and perfectly divisible good using
a uniform-price format. She can oﬀer a ﬁxed supply Q or, more generally, she can post a
(weakly) increasing3 and right-continuous (aggregate) supply schedule S(p). She can also set
ar e s e r v ep r i c epL ≥ 0, under which no sale occurs.
There are n ≥ 2 (male) risk-neutral bidders. The per unit value of the good to each
bidder is v. This value is commonly known4 to the bidders (or, equivalently, is the expected
value of a commonly known distribution), while the seller knows only that v is distributed
over some nonempty interval [vL,v H], with c.d.f. F(v). Each bidder i competes by simul-
taneously submitting a decreasing and left-continuous demand schedule di(p),r e p r e s e n t i n g
3 In the following, this and similar qualiﬁers always hold in the weak sense, unless otherwise noted.
4 A natural generalization of this assumption is to endow bidders with proprietary information stemming
from private signals. This is carried out in Wilson (1979) and in Back and Zender (1993), but – like us
– they study equilibria which do not depend on the signals received; therefore the generalization would be
inconsequential. Signal-dependent symmetric equilibria are studied in Wang and Zender (2002).
3his cumulative demand for the good at a price not greater than p. The resulting aggregate
demand schedule D(p)=
Pn
i=1 di(p) is also decreasing and left-continuous.
Following Back and Zender (1993), we deﬁne the stop-out price by
P =s u p{p ≥ pL | D(p) ≥ S(p)}
when the set {p : D(p) ≥ S(p)} is not empty, and otherwise we let P = pL. When possible,
this deﬁnition ensures that the stop-out price P clears the market. Moreover, if there are
multiple clearing prices, it selects the highest one; if there is no clearing price because of a
discontinuity, it selects the price at the discontinuity point; if there is not suﬃcient demand
at pL, it forces the stop-out price to be pL and the good is not auctioned in full.
The rest of the allocation rule is as follows. If P clears the market, each bidder i is awarded
aq u a n t i t yb di(P)=di(P). Otherwise, there is an excess demand5 E(P)=D(P)−S(P) > 0,
which is rationed pro rata at the margin. Let ∆di(P)=di(P) − limp↓P di(p) and ∆D(P)=
Pn





3 Underpricing equilibria under ﬁxed supply
Throughout this section, we assume that the divisible good is in ﬁxed supply at a level
Q. Except for her early choice of the uniform-price format and the reserve price pL,t h e
seller plays no strategic role and we restrict attention to the (sub)game among the n bidders
engaged in the auction. The payoﬀ to bidder i is πi =( v − P)b di(P),w h e r eP now depends
only on the bidders’ choice of their demand schedules. If v<p L, participating in the auction
is not proﬁtable. We focus on the case where v ≥ pL. Since bid schedules at prices p<p L
are immaterial, we omit them for simplicity.
The natural benchmark case is the competitive equilibrium, where the market clears at
the Walrasian price P = v. The next proposition establishes the existence of a wide class
of symmetric underpricing equilibria in pure strategies. For any price p∗ between pL and v,
bidders inhibit price competition by submitting steep demand curves and split symmetrically
the ﬁxed supply of the divisible good. This behavior is self-enforcing because players’ infra-
marginal bids (made costless in equilibrium by the uniform price format) ensure that each
5 Without loss of generality, our continuity assumptions rule out the possibility of a strictly positive excess
supply.
4bidder’s marginal cost is higher than p∗. This rules out any incentive to raise the price in
order to acquire higher quantities.
Proposition 1 Assume v ≥ pL and a ﬁxed supply S(p)=Q for all p ≥ pL. For any price p∗
in [pL,v], there exists a symmetric Nash equilibrium in pure strategies such that the stop-out




       
       
0 if p>v ,
y(p) if p∗ <p≤ v,
z(p) if pL ≤ p ≤ p∗,
(1)

















2y0(p) ≤ (v − p)y00(p) for all p in (p∗,v); (4)












There are a few good reasons for our exhibiting this class. First, the equilibria of Proposi-
tion 1 encompass the notable cases of symmetric underpricing equilibria when v is commonly
known, as listed in Nyborg (2002). These include the linear equilibria of Wilson (1979), and
both the linear equilibria of Theorem 1 and the nonlinear equilibria of Theorem 4 in Back and
Zender (1993). Notwithstanding this, we note that the assumptions of twice diﬀerentiability
on y(p) and convexity on z(p) can be relaxed and thus there exist other symmetric equilibria
outside of this class.
Second, when the supply schedule is increasing and concave, the equilibria in this class
can be generalized to provide a natural mapping between the cases of ﬁxed and increasing
(concave) supply. This is carried out in Section 4. Third, in Section 5 (Proposition 4) we
derive the choice of y(p) and z(p) that is most conducive to underpricing for an arbitrary
increasing supply. We prove that the resulting proﬁle of demand schedules supports the
largest set of symmetric equilibrium prices (both within and without the class of equilibria
5in Proposition 1). Therefore, this class contains the symmetric equilibrium which is most
conducive to underpricing under an increasing supply.
Proposition 1 shows that, once the seller has announced a ﬁxed supply Q and set a
reserve price pL, any stop-out price between pL and the expected value v can be sustained
in equilibrium. Since the interval [pL,v] exhausts the set of feasible and individually rational
stop-out prices, Proposition 1 is akin to a “folk theorem” for uniform-price auctions in ﬁxed
supply. In particular, for pL ≤ vL bidders can always induce prices below the minimum resale
value and thus earn positive proﬁts with certainty. For those Treasury auctions which set the
reserve price to zero, this makes the possibility of an underpricing equilibrium far from rare.
Proposition 1 allows for a continuum of equilibrium prices. However, under a ﬁxed supply,
all bidders prefer a lower price. Thus, the most reasonable prediction is that the stop-out
price should be P = pL, which is the only Pareto eﬃcient outcome for the bidders. This idea
is formally captured by applying the coalition-proofness reﬁnement proposed in Bernheim et
alii (1987). Since P = pL is the worst outcome from the seller’s viewpoint, its prominence
makes it important for her to enhance price competition. The next section suggests a possible
route.
4 Underpricing equilibria under increasing supply
Under a ﬁxed supply Q of the divisible good, Proposition 1 shows that the n bidders can
sustain an underpricing equilibrium at a stop-out price p∗ in [pL,v) and split symmetrically
the quantity Q by posting the proﬁle of demand schedules {d∗
j(p)}n
j=1.
Suppose from now on that the seller commmits ex ante to an increasing supply schedule
S(p).G i v e np∗, assume that S(p∗)=Q so that coordination on p∗ is still feasible. The next





+(p)]/[d(p)] be the (right-hand) price elasticity of the demand schedules
{d∗
j(p)}n
j=1 at a price p in [pL,v) and set δ(p∗)=l i m p↓p∗ δ(p). Similarly, let σ(p) and σ(p∗)
be the corresponding price elasticities for the supply schedule S(p).
Proposition 2 Assume v>p L and an increasing, absolutely continuous supply schedule.







− (n − 1)δ(p∗)
¸
> 0. (6)
6If σ(p∗) >α (p∗,v,n), then coordination on p∗ by submitting the proﬁle of demand schedules
{d∗
j(p)}n
j=1 is no longer an equilibrium for the n bidders.
Intuitively, when the elasticity of the supply schedule is suﬃciently high, the negative price
eﬀect on bidder i’s proﬁts due to the increase in his purchase price is more than compensated
b yt h ep o s i t i v eq u a n t i t ye ﬀect induced by the increase in the quantity he wins. This makes i’s
payoﬀ (locally) increasing to the right of p∗ and induces him to bid more aggressively, raising
the stop-out price above p∗.N o t et h a tα(p∗,v,n) is decreasing in the number of bidders. As
n increases, the price eﬀect sustaining p∗ has less bite and the quantity eﬀect necessary to
countervail it can be achieved with a lower elasticity of the supply schedule.
It is important to clarify the scope of Proposition 2. We do not assume that the seller
knows v. She cannot compute α and she cannot directly use it to undermine an underpricing
equilibrium. Proposition 2 shows only that bidders’ coordination on p∗ is not enforceable




nσ(p∗)+( n − 1)δ(p∗)
i−1
. (7)
However, as it stands, Proposition 2 suggests that the seller may have an incentive to strate-
gically precommit to an elastic supply schedule. In Section 6 we show that this is indeed
correct.
We point out the analogy with the oligopoly game discussed in Klemperer and Meyer
(1989). Here, the role of the ﬁr m si sp l a y e db yt h ei n t e r m e d i a r ies, usually primary dealers,
who buy in the auction at a uniform price p∗ and resale at a common price v. Similarly, the
role of the demand function is played by the supply curve adopted by the seller; in particular,
note that the expression on the left hand side of (7) is the analog of the Lerner’s index.
When the stop-out price is p∗, bidder i’s proﬁti sπi(p∗)=( v − p∗)xi(p∗),w h e r exi(p∗) is
the residual supply for bidder i. A necessary condition for p∗ to be an equilibrium price is
∂πi/∂p|p=p∗ ≤ 0 for all i.T h i si se q u i v a l e n tt o(v−p∗)/p∗ ≤ γ−1(p∗),w h e r eγ(p) is the price
elasticity of the residual supply. In the case of symmetric equilibria, γ−1(p∗) reduces to the
expression on the right hand side of (7).
Proposition 2 does not rule out the possibility of underpricing equilibria under an in-
creasing supply schedule. The next proposition is an existence result that characterizes a
large class of underpricing equilibria. It is a natural generalization of Proposition 1, which is
precisely recovered for a ﬁxed supply S(p)=Q.
7Proposition 3 Assume v ≥ pL and an increasing, concave, continuous supply S(p) for all
p ≥ pL. Given a price p∗ in [pL,v], suppose that there exist a positive, decreasing and twice




















2y0(p) ≤ (v − p)y00(p) for all p in (p∗,v); (10)

















Then there exists a symmetric Nash equilibrium in pure strategies such that the stop-out price




       
       
0 if p>v ,
y(p) if p∗ <p≤ v,
z(p) if pL ≤ p ≤ p∗.
(12)
Note that, consistently with Proposition 2, Condition (9) implies that, if for a given v the
slope S0
+(p∗) of the supply function is suﬃciently high, these proﬁles of demand schedules no
longer support an underpricing equilibrium at p = p∗.
5 Underpricing equilibria under linear supply
Proposition 2 suggests how the seller might be able to induce more aggressive bidding by
posting an increasing supply schedule. In essence, what she has to accomplish is making
the quantity eﬀect suﬃciently high to compensate for the highest possible price eﬀect that
bidders’ strategies can achieve. On the other hand, bidders submit their demand schedules
only after the supply curve has been announced. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that
they can try to contrast the quantity eﬀect induced by an increasing supply and sustain low
prices by resorting to steeper demand schedules.
The next proposition characterizes the set of all prices that can be supported as a sym-
metric equilibrium in a uniform-price auction when the supply increases endogenously with
8its price. It turns out that adopting perfectly inelastic demand schedules (with a ﬂat at the
equilibrium price) is the best way for bidders to sustain low stop-out prices when they face
an increasing supply curve.
The intuition is the following. When the supply increases with its (uniform) price, there
is an incentive to bid more aggressively and win a higher amount of of the good. To sustain
a low price, bidders need to compensate this positive quantity eﬀect by reducing the residual
supply available to their competitors. This is most eﬀectively done by submitting perfectly
inelastic demand schedules.
Proposition 4 Assume v ≥ pL and an increasing, continuous supply schedule S(p).L e t
T be the set of all stop-out prices that can be supported by a symmetric equilibrium where
players submit decreasing demand schedules. Consider the set T0 of all stop-out prices p∗
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if pL ≤ p ≤ p∗,
(13)
for i =1 ,...,n.T h e nT = T0.
The equilibria of Proposition 4 are again a special case of Proposition 1. However, the
power of the result lies elsewhere: for any supply schedule announced by the seller, the
inelastic schedules described in (13) represent the best chance for the bidders to sustain an
underpricing equilibrium at price p∗. Thus, there is no loss of generality in restrict attention
to this proﬁle of bids. We apply this result to the analysis of the strategic choice of a supply
schedule by the seller.
We postpone the analysis of the full game to the next section and consider here the second
stage, in which bidders compete after the seller has announced her choice of the supply
schedule. For tractability, we make the assumption that the seller has posted a reserve price
pL ≥ 0 and an increasing (piecewise) linear supply function
S(p)=
(
r + s(p − pL) if p ≥ pL
0 otherwise
(14)
9with r,s ≥ 0.T h et r i p l e{pL,r,s} deﬁnes the linear supply mechanism chosen by the seller.
The special case of a ﬁxed supply corresponds to a choice of s =0 .
Given the supply mechanism {pL,r,s},f o rv<p L there is no trade. If v ≥ pL,w e
know from Proposition 4 that without loss of generality we can assume that bidders post the
demand schedules given in (13). Hence, substituting δ(p∗)=0in (7), we ﬁnd that bidders







r + s(p∗ − pL)
,
the set of possible equilibrium stop-out prices turns out to be the interval [pc,v],w h e r e







(n +1 ) s
¾
. (16)
The lower bound on underpricing is pc, which is properly deﬁned for s>0.( F o rs =0 ,
the supply is ﬁxed and thus pc = pL.) This bound is increasing in the number of bidders.
Therefore, when the supply is strictly increasing, attracting bidders works to the advantage of
the seller. Moreover, as the number n of bidders increases, pc tends to v and thus the stop-out
price must converge to the competitive benchmark. With a strictly increasing supply and an
inﬁnite number of players, the seller could extract all the surplus from the bidders. Contrast
this with the case of a ﬁxed supply in Proposition 1, where the number of bidders does not
aﬀect the set of underpricing equilibria.
Using pc, we can compare the extent of the possible underpricing when the seller commits
ex ante to an increasing supply schedule or reserves the right to decrease ex post a ﬁxed
supply. Assuming pL =0for simplicity, Back and Zender (2001) shows that the set of





Since pc ≥ pz for r/s ≤ v/n, neither procedure is ap r i o r imore eﬀective in restricting the risk
of underpricing. However, since the support of v is the interval [vL,v H],b yc h o o s i n gr and s
with r/s < vL/n the seller can ensure that her ex ante commitment is strictly less conducive
to underpricing for any v. Tilting the supply schedule ex ante provides more ﬂexibility than
the right to shift it backwards ex post.
10T h ec a s eo fs u p p l yu n c e r t a i n t y
When pc >p L, the use of an increasing supply schedule genuinely reduces the scope for
underpricing with respect to the mere introduction of a reserve price pL. This occurs for
v>p L+(r/ns), when the negative price eﬀect on bidder i’s proﬁts due to the increase in the
purchase price cannot be made suﬃciently strong – even assuming perfectly inelastic demand
schedules – to overturn the positive quantity eﬀect due to the increasing supply. Roughly
speaking, then, an increasing supply really makes a diﬀerence only when v>p L +(r/ns).I t
is a natural question to ask whether this would remain true under diﬀerent speciﬁcations of
the bidding environment.
We consider the important case when there is supply uncertainty or, more generally,
when the bidders have private information6 about the exact amount of the good on oﬀer.
The leading example is the case of Treasury auctions, where noncompetitive bidders are
allowed to submit demands to be ﬁlled at the stop-out price before the (remaining) quantity
is awarded to the competitive bidders. When the amount of noncompetitive demand is not
known to the competitive bidders, they face supply uncertainty. Another example arises in
electricity markets, when additional power may unexpectedly become available.
Under supply uncertainty, Back and Zender (1993) has derived a class of symmetric
equilibria7 which on average leads to strictly less underpricing than in the standard case.
Under a mild assumption on the support of the noncompetitive demand, Nyborg (2002) has
proved that these are essentially the only symmetric equilibria robust to supply uncertainty.
Therefore, the presence of this form of uncertainty among the bidders reduces (but does not
necessarily rule out) the extent of the expected underpricing.
The next proposition derives the analog of these symmetric equilibria in the case of
an increasing linear supply schedule as given in (14). The analysis conﬁrms that supply
uncertainty reduces but does not eliminate the expected underpricing with respect to the
case without uncertainty. Moreover, the linearity of the supply schedule makes it possible
to separate the eﬀects of an increasing supply schedule and of supply uncertainty: as in the
standard case, the introduction of an increasing supply genuinely makes a diﬀerence exactly
when v>p L +( r/ns). And, when it makes a diﬀerence, it eliminates the (symmetric)
6 In equilibrium, each bidder submits a demand schedule which is optimal for all realizations of the un-
certainty over the supply. Therefore, it is not necessary that bidders agree on the probability distribution,
provided that the support is the same. We assume for simplicity that the distribution is unique.
7 These equilibria are a special case of Proposition 1. They can be read oﬀ Proposition 5 by substituting
S(p)=Q and s =0 .
11underpricing equilibria.
To model supply uncertainty, we follow Back and Zender (1993) and add to the basic
model the assumption that the supply available to the competitive bidders at price p is
max{S(p) − η,0},w h e r eη ≥ 0 is the random reduction due to noncompetitive demand.
We assume that the support of η is the interval [0,limp↑+∞ S(p)] and that each competitive
bidder is allowed to demand as much as he wishes. As a function of S(p) − η, the stop-out
price is now a random variable. We say that underpricing occurs if the realized stop-out price
is strictly lower than v for some value8 of η.
Proposition 5 Assume v ≥ pL and an increasing linear supply schedule S(p) as in (14).











for p∗ <p≤ v,w h e r eα is a positive constant such that y(p∗)=[ S(p∗)/n].












for p∗ <p≤ v,w h e r eα is any positive constant such that y(p∗)=[ S(p∗)/2].
The remaining speciﬁcation of the equilibrium demand schedule d∗
i(p) is identical to (12)
in Proposition 3. For s =0 , we obtain the equilibria under ﬁx e ds u p p l yg i v e ni nB a c ka n d
Zender (1993). For p∗ ↑ v, letting α ↑ +∞ recovers the competitive benchmark, where P = v
and no underpricing occurs. Note that, when the function y(p) in (17) or (18) is not decreasing
over the interval (p∗,v], supply uncertainty destroys all the equilibria of Proposition 3.
The realized stop-out price is deﬁned implicitly by the equation
nd∗(p)=m a x {S(p) − η,0} (19)
as a function of η. When the noncompetitive demand is η =0 , the stop-out price is p∗.I fw e
parameterize the equilibria of Proposition 5 by p∗ in [pL,v), we can view the stop-out price
P(η;p∗) as a function of η and the parameter p∗.S i n c ey(p) in the corresponding equilibrium





8 This is equivalent to the milder requirement that underpricing occurs with positive probability because
the equilibrium demand schedules are decreasing and convex.
12for all η. Roughly speaking, the equilibrium associated with a lower p∗ generates a higher
level of underpricing. In particular, the most severe underpricing occurs when p∗ = pL and
y(pL)=r/n.
Note that (19) implies also that the stop-out price P(η;p∗) is increasing in η for any
p∗. Hence, P(0;p∗) provides an immediate bound for the underpricing which can occur at
the equilibrium associated with p∗. Moreover, since the support of η is a nondegenerate
interval, the expected underpricing is strictly less than implied by P(0;p∗) conﬁrming Back
and Zender’s (1993) result. The exact computation of the expected underpricing depends on
the distribution of η a n di si ng e n e r a ll o n ga n dt e d i o u s :e v e ni nt h es i m p l e rc a s eo faﬁxed
supply, Back and Zender (1993) works out only the special case n =2 . However, the point
that an increasing supply genuinely makes a diﬀerence exactly when v>p L +(r/ns) can be
proved directly.
Suppose n =2 .( T h ea r g u m e n tf o rn ≥ 3 is analogous.) For any p∗ in [pL,v), substituting















But y(p) can be a piece of the equilibrium demand schedule only if it is decreasing or,












The left-hand side is bounded above by s because p∗ <p≤ v. The right-hand side is bounded
below by (r/2) · [1/(v − pL)] because S(p∗) ≥ r and p∗ ≥ pL. Therefore, an underpricing
equilibrium can occur only if v ≤ pL +( r/2s).
Finally, note that the proﬁle of strategies in Proposition 4 is no longer an equilibrium.
Intuitively, the diﬃculty is that supply uncertainty requires that bidders’ demand curves
must be ex post optimal for the stop-out price associated with any realization of η,w h i l et h e
schedules of Proposition 4 are optimal only at p∗. This situation is the analog of Klemperer
and Meyer’s (1989) analysis of supply function equilibria in oligopoly, where uncertainty
about the market demand narrows down the set of symmetric equilibria.
6 The choice of a supply schedule
In this section we let the seller explicitly use her supply schedule as a strategic variable. We
consider a two-stage game where the seller ﬁrst publicly commits to an increasing linear supply
13curve and then bidders compete simultaneously on demand schedules within a uniform-price
auction.
We assume that the seller’s payoﬀ πs is the diﬀerence between the revenue she collects
when selling a quantity Q at a uniform price of P and a cost function C(Q);t h a ti s ,πs =
P · Q − C(Q). In the standard case where the supply is ﬁxed and C(Q)=0 , maximizing
πs is consistent with avoiding underpricing equilibria. More generally, this formulation takes
into account also the costs of auctioning diﬀerent quantities. Besides the obvious costs of
running the auction, this may incorporate institutional considerations about the eﬀects of
issuing debt in the case of Treasury auctions or of diluting control in the case of IPO auctions
or of risking a blackout in the electricity market.
F o rt r a c t a b i l i t y ,w em a k et h ef o l l o w i n ga s s u m p tions. The seller’s cost function for selling
aq u a n t i t yQ is C(Q)=α+β(Q− ¯ Q)2,w i t hα ≥ 0 and β>0; here, ¯ Q represents her target
quantity. Thus, ¯ Q could be the number of securities that the Treasury would ideally like to
auction, the target quantity of shares to be issued through an IPO or the current demand for
power in an electricity market. The seller sets a linear supply schedule by choosing a triple
{pL,r,s} of positive reals. There is no supply uncertainty.
We know from Section 5 that bidders can coordinate on any stop-out price in [pc,v] and
therefore the second stage allows for multiple equilibria. However, bidder i’s payoﬀ in the
symmetric equilibrium with stop-out price p is
πi(p)=( v − p)b di(p)=( v − p)
·




This quadratic function attains its maximum at ˆ p =( 1 /2)[v + pL − (r/s)] <p c.A s s u m i n g
that the bidders select the only Pareto eﬃcient (and coalition-proof) equilibrium, we reﬁne
the set of possible stop-out prices arising in the second-stage to the singleton pc in (16).
Although a stop-out price lower than v cannot be ruled out, increasing the elasticity
of the supply schedule enhances price competition among bidders and may lead to a higher
equilibrium price. On the other hand, making the supply schedule more elastic contrasts with
the objective of maintaining control on the total quantity auctioned, which is better served by
a ﬁxed supply. There is an obvious trade-oﬀ between price competition and quantity control.
The next proposition states that the best trade-oﬀ is not struck at either extreme.
Proposition 6 Suppose that the seller believes v to be uniformly distributed on [0,1].T h e
optimal linear supply mechanism exists and it is strictly increasing for p ≥ pL,w i t h0 <s ∗ <
+∞.
14Note that, if the simple assumption of a linear supply mechanism suﬃces to rule out the
optimality of a constant supply, this is true a fortiori for more general supply mechanisms.
Therefore, the restriction to linear supply mechanisms does not detract from the result. A
second advantage of this restriction is that one can explicitly solve the game and derive the
optimal supply mechanism, making comparative statics possible.
For an example, the next proposition characterizes the optimal linear supply mechanism
with two bidders and a target quantity ¯ Q =0 .
Proposition 7 Suppose that the seller believes v to be uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Assume
n =2and a cost function C(Q)=a + bQ2 with a ≥ 0 and b>0. The optimal linear supply











We brieﬂy comment on this example. Under the optimal linear supply mechanism, the
seller’s proﬁti sE(πs)=1 /(20b) − a. The cost function has two parameters: a may be
interpreted as the ﬁxed (and unavoidable) cost of running the auction; instead, b is positively
related to the marginal cost of expanding the quantity issued. Not surprisingly, the seller’s
proﬁt increases as either parameter decreases. Note that the reserve price is set below the
bidders’ expected value (that is, E(v)=1 /2): when the supply is not constrained to be ﬁxed,
the seller gets higher proﬁts by reducing the risk of not selling the good while inhibiting
bidders’ coordination on low prices.
Finally, the slope of the supply schedule decreases as b increases: as the cost of expanding
Q increases, the supply becomes more inelastic. In particular, a ﬁxed supply would become
optimal for b → +∞. On the other hand, as b → 0, the optimal linear supply mechanism
would ﬁx the reserve price at pL =2 /5 and let the supply be perfectly elastic. This would
make inﬁnite both the quantity auctioned and the seller’s proﬁt. However, these extreme cases
must be taken with a grain of salt because they depend heavily on the implicit assumption
that the valuation of the buyers does not depend on the quantity issued. We ﬁnd it more
plausible to assume that our model holds only over an intermediate range of parameters.
7C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
We close the paper with some remarks on the implications of our analysis for the two promi-
nent examples of Treasury auctions and initial public oﬀerings.
15The market for Treasury securities is by far the most relevant example of a widespread
use of uniform-price auctions for divisible goods. This paper suggests that, for uniform-price
auctions, the practice to combine a ﬁxed supply with a reserve price below market values
can be suboptimal for the Treasury. The adoption of an elastic supply with an appropriate
reserve price may allow the Treasury to enhance price competition and raise higher expected
revenues. Moreover, the use of an elastic supply would enable the Treasury to exploit a
positive correlation between the supply of securities in the primary market and the stop-out
price. Successful auctions with high stop-out prices (and low yields) would be associated to
higher issuances, while unsuccessful auctions would turn out in a lower issuance. Hence, the
introduction of uniform-price auctions with an elastic supply would go toward a reduction of
the overall cost of public debt.
There is an obvious trade-oﬀ between controlling the interest rates and the supply of se-
curities to the market. Therefore, while selecting an increasing supply schedule, the Treasury
must compromise between diﬀerent objectives. A ﬁxed supply may be adequate when the
prime objective of the Treasury is the amount of debt rather than its unit cost. Instead, a
perfectly elastic supply may be appropriate when the cost of issuing debt in a variable supply
is small compared to the beneﬁt of controlling the interest rate in the primary market. This
latter choice, used for example in Italy up to 1962, lets the monetary authorities know in
advance the cost of issuing new debt. However, it also implies that the Treasury loses control
on the amount of securities9 supplied to the market.
Our analysis suggests that an optimal way to share the control on yields and quantities
between the market and the monetary authorities is to post an increasing (but not perfectly
elastic) supply schedule and a reserve price close to the expected resale value in the secondary
market. The frequently observed choice of a zero reserve price adopted in several primary
markets seems inadequate. Moreover, this may work to the advantage of the Treasury and
encourage participation: increasing the number of dealers in the primary market leads to
stronger price competition and reduces the need for an elastic supply schedule, leading to a
tighter control on the liquidity of the market.
Another prominent example of using uniform-price auctions for divisible goods concerns
the initial public oﬀerings (IPOs) of unseasoned shares; see Sherman (2001) for a review
of the diﬀerent methods used. Although book-building has been the dominant mechanism
for most of the ’90s, in the last few years an increasing number of companies have decided
9 A partial solution is oﬀered by the possibility of reopening the auction; see Scalia (1997).
16to issue stocks on-line using Internet-based uniform-price auctions; see for example the site
http://www.openipo.com. Also, Israel frequently conducts its IPOs using uniform-price
auctions.
The participants in an IPO are usually a seller (the company which goes public), a ﬁnancial
intermediary and the investors. As in Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet (2000), assume that the
seller seeks to maximize the proceeds from the IPO and the ﬁnancial intermediary acts in the
seller’s best interest. Then a uniform-price IPO auction ﬁts the simple model of Section 2
and our analysis implies that a ﬁxed supply may lead to possibly large underpricing. This
theoretical result is conﬁrmed in Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet (2000). Likewise, by analyzing
27 IPO uniform-price auctions held in Israel between 1993 and 1996, Kandel et alii (1998)
have found signiﬁcant underpricing, with demand schedules that have a ﬂat around the IPO
price and are very similar to those described in Proposition 1.
Our analysis shows that a company which goes public has a simple way to reduce the
possibility of large underpricing and raise more money. Instead of announcing a ﬁxed supply,
the company should make the supply of shares a function of the stop-out price. This would
encourage investors to bid more aggressively in the hope of being awarded a higher amount
of shares. As suggested in Proposition 6, this mechanism is robust to the possibility the
company faces a cost in selling a number of shares diﬀerent from a target supply.
17Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . The proof is in three steps. First, we compute the residual
supply for bidder i when his competitors follow the equilibrium strategies. Second, we check
that, when the stop-out price is p∗, his best reply is to post a demand schedule such that
limp↓p∗ di(p)=Q/n and thus, in particular, the schedule described in (1). Third, we establish
that p∗ is his preferred stop-out price.
Consider ﬁrst bidder i’s residual supply. Suppose that his competitors follow the equilib-
rium strategies. Their aggregate demand is D−i(p)=
P
k6=i d∗
k(p) and therefore the residual





Q if p>v ,
Q − (n − 1)y(p) if p∗ <p≤ v,
Q − (n − 1)z(p) if pL ≤ p<p ∗,
with a possible ﬂat at p = p∗ given by a closed interval [a,Q/n], for some positive a ≤ Q/n.
Consider now bidder i’s best reply when the stop-out price is p∗.P l a y e r i can win any
quantity Q∗ between a and Q/n by submitting an appropriate demand schedule di(p) such
that limp↓p∗ di(p)=Q∗. Rationing occurs only if limp↓p∗ di(p) <Q / n . Since bidder i’s
payoﬀ a tt h es t o p - o u tp r i c ep∗ is πi =( v − p∗)xi(p∗), the best he can do is maximizing his
assigned quantity b di(p∗) by going for Q∗ = Q/n; that is, bidder i’s best reply must satisfy
limp↓p∗ di(p)=Q/n.
Finally, we check that the preferred stop-out price is indeed p∗. To avoid negative payoﬀs,
it cannot be greater than v. Thus, it suﬃces to show that, as a function of the stop-out price
P, πi achieves its maximum at p∗. We check this separately over the two intervals [pL,p ∗]
and [p∗,v].
Over the interval [pL,p ∗], xi(p) is continuous and concave. Thus, πi =( v−p)xi(p) is also
a continuous and concave function over [pL,p ∗]. Therefore, it is increasing over this interval if
its (left-hand) derivative
∂−πi(p∗)




this follows from (5).
Consider now the interval [p∗,v]. Similarly to the above, πi is continuous over (p∗,v].
Moreover, bidder i has no incentive to raise the aggregate demand above Q because only his
demand would be rationed; hence, we can assume that no rationing takes place above p∗.
Thus πi is right-continuous (and hence continuous) at p = p∗ as well. It achieves its maximum
at p∗ if its (right-hand) derivative
∂+πi(p∗)
∂p ≤ 0 and its second derivative
∂2πi(p)
∂p2 ≤ 0 for all p
in (p∗,v). These two inequalities follow respectively from (3) and (4). 2
18P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . Note that α(p∗,v,n) > 0 by (3). It is obvious that the proﬁle
{d∗
j(p)}n
j=1 described in (1) can still achieve the stop-out price p∗ and a symmetric split of
Q, giving each bidder a proﬁt πi =( v − p∗)(Q/n). We claim that, for σ(p∗) >α (p∗,v,n),
{d∗
j(p)}n
j=1 is no longer a Nash equilibrium because any bidder i strictly prefers to deviate.
More precisely, we show that i’s proﬁts are increasing in a right neighborhood of p∗ and thus
he prefers to bid more aggressively, raising the stop-out price above p∗.
Suppose that i’s competitors follow their part of the strategy proﬁle {d∗
j(p)}n
j=1. Substi-
tuting S(p) for Q in the proof of Proposition 1, the residual supply curve for bidder i in the
interval (p∗,v] is
xi(p)=S(p) − (n − 1)y(p).
Moreover (see Proof of Proposition 1), bidder i’s proﬁt function πi(p)=( v−p)xi(p) is right-
continuous at p = p∗.T h e r e f o r e ,i ts u ﬃces to show that its (right-hand) derivative is strictly
positive in a (right) neighborhood of p∗.S i n c eS(p) is increasing with S(p∗)=Q and y(p) is
decreasing with limp↓p∗ y(p)=( Q/n),f o rp>p ∗ we have
∂+πi(p)
∂p =( v − p)
£
S0
+(p) − (n − 1)y0
+(p)
¤
− S(p)+( n − 1)y(p)
≥ (v − p)
£
S0




For ε>0 suﬃciently small, (6) and continuity imply that the last expression is strictly
positive in (p∗,p ∗ + ε), which establishes the claim. 2
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . The proof is very similar to the one of Proposition 1. The





S(p) if p>v ,
S(p) − (n − 1)y(p) if p∗ <p≤ v,
S(p) − (n − 1)z(p) if pL ≤ p<p ∗,
with a possible ﬂat at p = p∗ given by a closed interval [a,S(p∗)/n], for some positive
a ≤ S(p∗)/n. Consider bidder i’s best reply when the stop-out price is p∗.H ec a nw i na n y
quantity Q∗ between a and S(p∗)/n by submitting an appropriate demand schedule di(p)
with limp↓p∗ di(p)=Q∗. Since rationing occurs only if limp↓p∗ di(p) <S (p∗)/n, the best he
can do is going for Q∗ = S(p∗)/n. Hence, his best reply must satisfy limp↓p∗ di(p)=S(p∗)/n.
To check that the preferred stop-out price is p∗,i ts u ﬃces to show that πi achieves its
maximum at p∗.O v e r[pL,p ∗], πi =( v − p)xi(p) is continuous and concave. Therefore, it is
19increasing over this interval if its (left-hand) derivative
∂−πi(p∗)
∂p ≥ 0. This follows from (11).
Over [p∗,v], πi is again continuous. It has a maximum at p∗ if its (right-hand) derivative
∂+πi(p∗)
∂p ≤ 0 and its second (right-hand) derivative
∂2πi(p)
∂p2 ≤ 0 for all p in (p∗,v).T h eﬁrst
inequality follows immediately from (9). The second inequality follows from (10), because
S(p) is increasing and concave. 2
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . It is obvious that T0 ⊆ T. We show that T ⊆ T0. Suppose that
p∗ in T is supported by a symmetric equilibrium where each bidder i posts the same demand
schedule di(p)=d(p). By symmetry, each bidder wins a quantity S(p∗)/n of the divisible
good10 at the price p∗.
By the deﬁnition of stop-out price, limp↓p∗ [nd(p) − S(p)] ≤ 0.A sd(p) is decreasing and
S(p) is continuous, this implies d(p) ≤ S(p∗)/n for p>p ∗. Therefore, the residual supply to
bidder i for p>p ∗ under the equilibrium proﬁle {di(·)}
n
i=1 is greater than under the proﬁle
in (13).
Hence, if bidder i does not ﬁnd proﬁtable to increase the stop-out price above p∗ when
his competitors post d(p), this must remain true when they submit the demand schedules in
(13). Furthermore, bidder i cannot make the stop-out price go below p∗ because for p<p ∗
the supply is entirely demanded by his competitors. It follows that the proﬁle of demands in
(13) supports p∗ as a stop-out price. 2
Proof of Proposition 5. Since noncompetitive demand makes the stop-out price a random
variable, bidder i now wants to maximize his expected payoﬀ Eπi = E [(v − p)xi(p)].A si n
the proofs of Propositions 1 and 3, this problem can be reduced to the choice of the optimal
stop-out price (given others’ equilibrium strategies).
Bidder i maximizes E(π) by making sure that his demand schedule is optimal for almost
all realizations of η. Given the support of η and the equilibrium strategies of the other bidders,








must hold for almost all p in [p∗,v). By the assumed monotonicity of y(p),t h i sd i ﬀerential
equation uniquely identiﬁes d∗(p) over this interval. For S0(p)=s, the solutions of this linear
10 By pro-rata rationing, in a symmetric equilibrium each bidder is assigned a quantity b di(p
∗)=S(p
∗)/n
even if there are ﬂats at the stop-out price that make aggregate demand exceed supply.
20diﬀerential equation for n ≥ 3 and n =2are respectively (17) and (18). The boundary
condition follows from (8). 2
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 . We need to show that there exists an optimal linear supply
mechanism and that it has s>0. For convenience, rewrite the cost function C(Q)=
α +β(Q− ¯ Q)2 as C(Q)=( α +β ¯ Q2) −(2β ¯ Q)Q+βQ2. Renaming the parameters, we study
the (seemingly) simpler cost function C(Q)=a −cQ+bQ2 for a ≥ 0, b>0 and c ≥ 0.T h i s
cost function has a minimum in Q∗ = c/(2b), where its value is C(Q∗)=4 ab−c2; we assume
4ab − c2 ≥ 0 and make sure that the cost is never negative.
Consider the ﬁrst stage of the game. Given the supply mechanism, the second stage leads








(n +1 ) s
¾
that determines the total quantity auctioned b D(P). The optimal linear supply mechanism
for the uniform-price auction is obtained by selecting the triple pL ≥ 0, r ≥ 0,a n ds ≥ 0 that









Depending on the parameters, we can distinguish three cases: i) if v<p L, there is no sale;
ii) if pL ≤ v ≤ pL +(r/ns), the stop-out price is pL and the quantity auctioned is b D(pL)=r;
and iii) if pL +[ r/(ns)] <v≤ 1, the stop-out price is P(v)=( nsv − r + spL)/[(n +1 ) s] and
the quantity auctioned is b D(P(v)) = [n/(n +1 ) ] ( sv + r − spL).
Therefore, the expectation can be written as the sum of three integrals over the (possibly
empty) supports v<p L, pL ≤ v ≤ pL+[r/(ns)] and pL+[r/(ns)] <v≤ 1.W r i t i n gp instead




















where integrals over empty supports are meant to be null. There are three possible cases:
A1)i fp>1, only the support of the ﬁrst integral is not null; A2)i fp ≤ 1 ≤ p+(r/ns),o n l y
21the support of the ﬁrst two integrals are not null; and A3)i fp +[ r/(ns)] < 1,a l lt h et h r e e
supports are not null.
The rest of the proof is in four steps. The ﬁrst step shows that s =0c a nb ep a r to fa n
optimal linear supply only if cases A1 or A2 hold. The second step determines the best triple
under case A2 and checks that it generates a strictly higher proﬁt than any triple under case
A1; therefore, the optimal triple does not occur in case A1. The third step exhibits a triple
for case A3 which generates an even higher proﬁt; therefore, the optimal triple does not occur
in case A2 either. It follows that the optimal triple (if it exists) must occur in case A3.T h e
fourth step establishes existence and concludes the proof.
Step 1. For r =0and s =0the supply is zero, which is obviously not optimal. If r>0
and s =0 ,w ea r ei nA2. Hence, s =0only if we are in A1 or A2.
Step 2. W eb e g i nb yn o t i n gt h a tA1 occurs for p ≥ 1, so the second and third integral in
(21) have an empty support. Since the reserve price is set too high and no one ever buys, the
seller’s proﬁti sj u s tE(πs)=−C(0) = −a.
Consider now A2, which occurs for p<1 ≤ p +( r/ns): only the third integral has an





p · r +( cr − br2)
¤
dv = −a +( 1− p)[(p + c)r − br2] (22)
This expression is a second-degree polynomial in p and r which does not explicitly depend
on s (provided that p +( r/2s) ≥ 1). Thus, we ignore s momentarily. We begin from the
boundary of the admissible region. Conditional on p =0 , the optimal choice is r = c/(2b)
which gives f(0,c/(2b),s)=−a + c2/(4b) ≥− a. Any triple with p =1or r =0can be
discarded, because it fails the test of making f(p,r,s) greater than −a.
Moving to the interior of the admissible region, the only stationary point which survives
this test has p =( 2− c)/3 and r =( 1+c)/3b.A sp ≥ 0, this is interesting only for c ≤ 2.




















with equality holding at c =2 . Hence, the highest proﬁti nA2 is attained for p =( 2− c)/3
and r =( 1+c)/3b if c ≤ 2 and for p =0and r = c/(2b) if c ≥ 2.
Reintroducing s in the picture, recall that this class requires p +( r/ns) ≥ 1.T h i sp l a c e s
an upper bound on the admissible values of s. More precisely, the optimal supply mechanisms
22are: a) pL =( 2− c)/3, r =( 1+c)/3b and s ≤ 1/(nb) if c ≤ 2; and b) p =0 , r = c/(2b) and
s ≤ c/(2nb) if c ≥ 2. They include as special cases the possibility of setting s =0 . Finally,
(23) shows that the seller’s proﬁt is higher than in A1.
Step 3. Consider now A3, under which no integral has an empty support ap r i o r i .T h e










n[nsv − (r − sp)][sv +( r − sp)]




























6bn3s3 − 6cn3rs− 6cn2s2 − 3n3s2 +6 bn3r2s +1 2 bn3rs2






3nr3 − 3n2rs2 − 6bn3s3r +2 n3s3 − 6bn3r2s2 +3 cn2s3
+3n3rs2 − 6n2r2s − 6bnr3s +6 cn3rs2 +6 cn2rs2 +3 cnr2s − 4br3s




Finding the maximizer of this expression is a hard task, but fortunately our argument
requires only to exhibit a triple (p,r,s) satisfying A3 and achieving a higher proﬁtt h a nA2.
Choosing the triple
ˆ p =0 , ˆ r =0 , ˆ s =
2n +3 c(n +1 )
4bn
11 All computations from here on have been carried out using Maple V (Release 5).
23in A3,w eo b t a i n
f (ˆ p, ˆ r,ˆ s)=−a +
2n +3 c(n +1 )
48b(n +1 )
,
which we compare against the values in (23). For c ≤ 2 (and n ≥ 2),i ti se a s i l yc h e c k e dt h a t
−a +













for c>2. Hence, (ˆ p, ˆ r,ˆ s) – which we do not claim is optimal – does better than any triple
satisfying A1 or A2. Note in particular that ˆ s>0.
Step 4. It remains to be shown that there actually exists an optimal triple in A3.W h i l e
f(p,r,s) is a continuous function, the region deﬁning A3 is not compact because s is un-
bounded from below; thus the maximization problem may not have a solution at all. Consider
what may happen for s → +∞.S i n c e A3 imposes p + r/(sn) ≤ 1,e i t h e ri )r = o(s) and
r → 0;o ri i )r = O(s) and the ratio (r/s) stay bounded between 0 and (1 − p)n.





as s → +∞.A s p<1, this guarantees that eventually f(p,r,s) < −a. Therefore, by a
standard argument, the set of triples over which the maximum of f(p,r,s) should be searched
can be trimmed and made compact without loss of generality. Then Weierstrass’ Theorem
ensures that a maximum exists.









as s → +∞.T h e np<1 guarantees again that eventually f(p,r,s) < −a, and the argument
given above applies as well.
We conclude that the triple p∗,r∗,s ∗ exists and belongs to A3, which in turn implies that
s∗ > 0. 2
24P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 . We know from Proposition 6 that the optimal linear mechanism





33pr2s − 16br3s +1 6 s3 +1 2 rs2 − 12ps3 − 24r2s
+48prs2 − 24p2s3 − 48br2s2 +4 8 pbr2s2 − 48brs3
+96bprs3 − 48bp2rs3 − 16bs4 +4 8 bps4 − 48bp2s4
+16bp3s4 +2 0 p3s3 − 60p2rs2 +7 r3¢
.
To increase readability, apply an increasing linear transformation and let g(p,r,s)=
108[E(πs)+a].T h e ng and E(πs) have the same maximizers. Collecting terms with respect
to p,n o t et h a tg is a cubic (in p) and that the coeﬃcient of its leading term is positive:
g(p,r,s)=
¡



































Hence, the two stationary points of g with respect to p are
p1 =
8brs +4 s +8 bs2 +1 0 r − 3
√
4br2s +4 s2 +5 r2
8bs2 +1 0 s
and
p2 =
8brs +4 s +8 bs2 +1 0 r +3
√
4br2s +4 s2 +5 r2
8bs2 +1 0 s
.
The cubic g has a local maximum in p = p1 and a local minimum in p = p2.S i n c ep2 ≥ 1 for
any pair (r,s) in the admissible set, this implies that the maximizers of g c a no n l yo c c u ra t
p =0or p = p1 depending on whether p1 < 0 or p1 ≥ 0, respectively. We check separately
the two subcases.
First, suppose p =0 . Then the function
g(0,r,s)=−
µ
16bs4 +1 6 br3s − 16s3 − 12rs2 +4 8 br2s2 +2 4 r2s − 7r3 +4 8 brs3
s2
¶



























Since both have r<0, they fall outside of the admissible set and the maximizer (if it exists)
can only be a corner solution with r =0 . Substituting r =0and maximizing g(0,0,s),w e
ﬁnd s =1 /(2b). However, p =0 , r =0 ,a n ds =1 /(2b) imply
p1 =
8brs +4 s +8 bs2 +1 0 r − 3
√
4br2s +4 s2 +5 r2





contradicting the initial assumption of p1 < 0.
Now, suppose p = p1. Then the function
g(p1,r,s)=
27(+8s3 − 28br2s2 − 16b2r2s3 − 10r2s +
p
(4br2s +4 s2 +5 r2)3)
s2(4bs +5 ) 2

























We rule out the third one because it is not admissible and the second one because it yields
(∂2g/∂r2) > 0.T h e ﬁrst candidate, instead, passes the second order conditions. Hence,
noting that p1 =2 /5 for r =0and s =5 /(4b), we conclude that the maximizer is at p =2 /5,
r =0and s =5 /(4b). This is the optimal linear supply mechanism we were after. 2
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